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Summary 
Whereas the dual enlargements of NATO and the EU have tended to sharpen the distinc-
tion between Russia and the EU, the EU’s Northern Dimension (ND) has encouraged a 
blurring of the frontiers between Russia and the northern members of the EU and the 
wider European Economic Area. This article briefly sets out the history of the ND, sum-
marising its most important specific characteristics and also features the role of regional 
organisations and other actors in the policy. This is followed by an overview of recent 
developments and meetings leading to a new ND. A detailed analysis of the ND’s future 
perspectives, setting out its strengths and weaknesses, is conducted. A special emphasis is 
placed on Russia’s role within the ND. Finally, the ND and the issue of borders in North-
ern Europe is considered, with the contention that the special nature of the ND could be 
lost should it be used as an instrument subservient to the wider EU-Russian relationship. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Erweiterungen von NATO und Europäischer Union haben die Abgrenzung zwischen 
Russland und der EU im Allgemeinen verstärkt. Die Nördliche Dimension (ND) der Eu-
ropäischen Union hingegen hat zu einer Aufweichung der Grenzen zwischen Russland 
und den nordeuropäischen Staaten der Union und des Gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraums 
geführt. Der vorliegende Artikel zeichnet die Geschichte der ND nach, fasst ihre wesent-
lichsten Charakteristika zusammen und beleuchtet die Rolle regionaler Organisationen 
und anderer Akteure im Rahmen dieser Politik. Es folgt ein Überblick über die jüngsten 
Entwicklungen und Treffen, in deren Folge eine neue ND erarbeitet worden ist. Vor die-
sem Hintergrund werden deren zukünftige Perspektiven, Stärken und Schwachpunkte 
analysiert, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf die Rolle Russlands gelegt wird. Abschlie-
ßend wird die These aufgestellt, dass der besondere Charakter der ND verloren zu gehen 
droht, wenn diese den allgemeinen Beziehungen der EU zu Russland untergeordnet wird. 
Prof. Clive Archer is Director of the Manchester European Research Institute at Manchester Metro-
politan University. Contact: c.archer@mmu.ac.uk. Tobias Etzold, M.A. is a PhD student at Manches-
ter Metropolitan University. Contact: tobias.etzold@student.mmu.ac.uk 
NORDEUROPAforum 1/2008  7 Clive Archer / Tobias Etzold 
Introduction
*
In post-Cold War Europe, the enlargements of NATO and the EU have been inter-
preted in a number of ways. This article refers to Northern Europe and the effect that 
the dual expansion – especially that of the EU – has had on the region, and the way 
that the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative of the EU may affect an understanding of 
enlargement. In particular, any view of enlargement is bound to affect views of borders 
and boundaries in Northern Europe, not least those between “the West” and Russia. 
Whereas the dual enlargements have tended to sharpen the distinction between Russia 
and the EU, the EU’s Northern Dimension has encouraged a blurring of the frontiers 
between Russia and the northern members of the EU (and the wider European Eco-
nomic Area), namely Poland, the three Baltic states and the Nordic countries. This ar-
ticle explains why this has been the case and contends that the special nature of the ND 
could be lost should it be used as an instrument subservient to the wider EU-Russian 
relationship. 
In the 1990s, the EU increased the divergence between its internal and its external bor-
ders, and thus between members and non-members. With the Schengen Agreement, the 
internal borders between the EU’s member states nearly ceased to exist, but external 
borders with non-EU-member states were fortified. Candidate states had to prove that 
they were able to meet the provisions of the Schengen Agreement in terms of securing 
their external borders. Meant as a security measure to protect Europe from cross-
border organised crime and illegal trade and trafficking, this requirement also makes 
legal cross-border trade, which for instance for many people in Ukraine and Belarus 
formed an important source of income, difficult if not impossible. 
Perhaps one of the most common views of what happened in Northern Europe after the 
end of the Cold War, and the prospect of the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU, 
has been the neo-realist approach whereby the West was seen to expand at the cost of 
Russia. If one compares the map of Northern Europe before the end of the Cold War – 
the Baltic Sea as a Mare Sovieticum – to that of the region afterwards – with the Baltic 
 
 
 
*   This article is based on papers presented at a “Workshop on borders and bordering” at the 
University of Manchester, December 1, 2006, and a conference on borders at the Univer-
sity of Leiden, March 30 2007. 
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Sea as a Mare Europaeum
1 –, then the strategic shift has been clearly in favour of the 
West and to the detriment of Russia. The border retreated from Szczecin to St. Peters-
burg. Nevertheless, Russia remained as a power to be reckoned with, not least because 
the US was no longer paying the sort of attention to Northern Europe that it did in the 
Cold War. Official thinking in Norway was particularly insistent on not having to face 
Russia itself across not only a land frontier but also an undefined maritime border.
2
However, there has been another more liberal institutionalist interpretation of what has 
happened in Northern Europe in the past fifteen years. This views the events there as 
not creating a new sharp divide, as described above. Yes, East Germany has become 
part of the Federal Republic; Sweden and Finland have joined the EU; the Baltic states 
and Poland have joined both the EU and NATO; and Russia remains outside these or-
ganisations. Yet even this organisational neatness hides a complexity. While NATO 
aircraft protect Baltic states’ skies, there are no NATO troops on their soil. Sweden is 
not part of the European Monetary Union, and Norway and Iceland are members of the 
European Economic Area rather than the EU. Yet, Iceland and Norway as non-EU 
member states belong to the Schengen area. A compromise has been found, which ap-
plies the provisions of Schengen in a less strict form for transit between the Russian 
enclave Kaliningrad and the Russian mainland after the EU accession of Lithuania and 
Poland. Also there is the ND which is now run jointly by the EU, Russia, Iceland and 
Norway. In policy terms the ND has, over almost a decade, encouraged and sponsored 
policies that involve partnerships with Russia and have treated Kaliningrad as a special 
place, a Russian enclave in the EU cut off from the Russian mainland after EU acces-
sion by Lithuania and Poland. Writers such as Pami Aalto have identified the ND as 
helping to overcome the divide between the EU and Russia in the north and making 
the divergence between the external and internal, less sharp. In that, it contrasts with 
the wider EU – and indeed Western – sceptical view of Russia by dealing with practi-
cal functional problems jointly, rather than tackling ‘high’ policies in a strategic way.
3
 
 
 
1   Tassinari, Fabricio: Mare Europaeum. Baltic Sea Security and Co-operation from post-
Wall to post-Enlargement Europe. Copenhagen 2004.
2   Archer, Clive: Norway outside the European Union. Norway and European integration 
from 1994 to 2004. London / New York 2005, 138–145.
3   Aalto, Pami: European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe. London / New 
York 2006.
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The creation of the ND can be seen as a consequence of developments allowing a third 
interpretation of the situation in the Nordic-Baltic region from the early 1990s. From 
the beginning of the 1990s, Western European countries tried to include Russia in in-
ternational co-operation. Regional organisations such as the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS), the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council (AC) 
were established in North-Eastern Europe. Within these organisations, Russia has co-
operated side by side with other countries on an equal footing. The final goal of these 
co-operative efforts was to integrate Russia in a way that would have transcended the 
need to alleviate regional dividing lines. This goal, however, has been only partially 
achieved. While providing important political forums, dialogue and debate, these or-
ganisations were too weak (politically, legally, organisationally and financially) to 
make a real difference in terms of implementing concrete projects and policies. 
Though generally interested in co-operation within these organisations, in practice 
Russia remained a reluctant and unpredictable partner. The dividing lines remained, 
not least prompted by the EU and NATO enlargement processes at the end of the 
1990s. In this context, the Finnish ND initiative is a new attempt to alleviate the re-
maining dividing lines in a regional context, and one that has had some success. How-
ever, the more the initiative is taken away from its functional, regional “low politics” 
roots, as stressed in the second interpretation above, the greater the danger that it be-
comes tainted by the wider political difficulties of Russia-European relations. This 
view sees only a limited prospect for liberal institutionalist links with a Russia that is 
stressing a more neo-realist approach in its relations with Europe. 
This article briefly sets out the history of the ND, summarising its most important specific 
characteristics and also features the role of regional organisations and other actors in the 
policy. This is followed by an overview of recent developments and meetings leading to a 
new ND. On that basis, a detailed analysis of the ND’s future perspectives, setting out its 
strengths and weaknesses, is conducted. In this context a special emphasis is placed on 
Russia’s role within the ND. Finally, the ND and the issue of borders in Northern Europe 
is considered and it is examined in terms of the three perspectives mentioned above. 
History of the Northern Dimension  
The idea of a Northern Dimension policy emerged in 1997 as a Finnish initiative. At 
that time, the main incentive behind the initiative was to increase attention towards 
North-Eastern Europe and to address new challenges and special development needs in 
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the region. These emerged with the significant changes in the 1990s – the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the regained independence of the Baltic States, and the accession of 
Sweden and Finland to the EU – and with the opportunities the region has to offer in 
respect of political, economic, cultural and scientific matters. On the macro-level, the 
principal objective of the initiative was from the start to provide added value through 
reinforced co-ordination and complementarity of the EU’s and individual member sta-
tes’ initiatives towards the region. It aimed at enhanced co-operation between all the 
countries in North-Eastern Europe.
4 In geographical terms, the ND covers the entire 
Baltic Sea region, North-West Russia, Norway, Iceland, the Barents region and the 
Arctic region. The ND established a political framework for co-operation between EU 
member states, the then candidate countries Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as 
well as Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. The USA and Canada have ob-
server status. Because of its wish to enhance co-operation between EU members and 
non-members and to include the non-members in the decision-making and policy im-
plementation processes, the ND has developed a partner-oriented approach.
5 The ND, 
dealing both with internal as well as external policies of the EU, offers a common 
framework for the promotion of policy dialogue and concrete co-operation. 
After the adoption of Guidelines for the implementation of the Northern Dimension by 
the European Council in Cologne in 1999, the European Council in Feira, Portugal, 
endorsed the first Action Plan for the Northern Dimension in the external and cross-
border policies, 2001–2003, in June 2000. This Northern Dimension Action Plan 
(NDAP) set out objectives, areas to be addressed and means by which to achieve the 
goals. Main areas to be addressed within the first NDAP were: infrastructure (includ-
ing transport, energy and telecommunication); environment and nuclear safety; educa-
tion, research, training and human resources development; public health and social 
 
 
 
4   Council of the European Union: Northern Dimension – Action Plan for the Northern Dimen-
sion with external and cross-border policies of the European Union 2000–2003. 9401/00, Ju-
ne 14, 2000 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/ndap/06_00_en.pdf, 
February 20, 2008), 2.
5   Catellani, Nicolas: “Outlining the Northern Dimension: toward regional co-operation in Nor-
thern Europe”. In: Idem and Antonio Missiroli: The European Union’s Northern Dimension. 
Rome: Laboratorio CeSPI, 2000 (http://www.cespi.it/Laboratorio/Lab__1=2000.pdf, February 
21, 2008), 12.
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administration; cross-border co-operation, trade and investment and the fight against, 
in particular, cross-border crime.
6
As from 2002, ND stakeholders started preparing the second NDAP, 2004–2006. This 
happened against a shifting background with Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania set 
to become EU members in May 2004. The new Action Plan was intended to provide a 
clearer framework for all ND partners, as, for some, the previous plan had failed to do 
so, and to establish clear and feasible strategic objectives, priorities and concrete ac-
tivities in the above mentioned issue areas which basically remained the same, though 
slightly restructured. Additionally, the second NDAP introduced two so-called cross-
cutting themes, the Arctic region and the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation 
as regions with specific development needs in nearly all ND issue areas.
7
In 2001, a Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership was launched by interna-
tional financial institutions, which in co-operation with the European Commission 
and the Russian Federation, implement and finance projects in the environmental sec-
tor. In 2003, a Northern Dimension Partnership on Public Health and Social Wellbe-
ing was formed as part of the ND framework dealing in particular with the prevention 
of communicable diseases such as HIV and TB. These partnerships present the con-
crete and practical side of the ND at the micro-level. Furthermore, at this level the ND 
consists of all the activities that the different actors conduct on a practical level in the 
ND area.
8
In general, the ND was not intended to create structures and institutions of its own. 
The initiative basically relies on existing infrastructure, instruments, institutions, skills 
and expertise provided by the EU and its partners. The ND also does not have a special 
budget. Projects within the ND are financed by EU financial instruments such as 
 
 
 
6   Council of the EU 2000, as footnote 4. 
7   Commission of the European Communities: Commission Working Document: The second 
Northern Dimension Action Plan 2004–2006, COM (2003) 343 final 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/ndap/ap2.pdf,  February 20, 
2008), 13–15.
8   Tuomioja, Erkki: “The Northern Dimension and the Finnish EU Presidency”. Speech 
given at the Conference on The Renewed Northern Dimension: A Tool for Enhanced 
Regional and Cross-border Co-operation in Tallinn,  June 9, 2006 
(http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_314/7593.html, February 20, 2008), 2.
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TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States), as far as 
they apply to the Russian Federation. Also INTERREG, one of EU’s four joint pro-
grammes in the field of European regional/structural policies, and in particular its 
INTERREG IIIb Baltic Sea programme (now Baltic Sea region programme 2007–
2013) and cross-border co-operation programmes, are crucial in financing the ND. Be-
fore enlargement, one of the pre-accession instruments, PHARE (Poland and Hun-
gary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), was important for the Baltic States and 
Poland. Besides these EU financing instruments, national governments as well as 
European and Nordic financial institutions, are also involved in ND project financing, 
particularly the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. Taking the involve-
ment of different EU instruments and institutions into account, the ND strives for their 
horizontal co-ordination.
9 As of 2007, the new European Neighbourhood Instrument 
could become instrumental for financing ND projects and should partly replace the 
previous financial instruments in order to simplify the complicated procedures, with 
different instruments and rules for the various groups of countries. 
Another special and, particularly from a political science viewpoint, interesting fea-
ture of the ND is the involvement of a number of actors – stakeholders – at various 
levels and of differing political and economic weights. Northern Europe is character-
ised by an institutional complexity with organisations that, partly, include Russia. 
Alongside national governments and EU institutions, regional organisations in 
North-Eastern Europe contributed considerably to the elaboration and implementa-
tion of the ND and in particular the second Action Plan. This involves the CBSS, AC, 
BEAC, Nordic Council (NC), Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), various parlia-
mentary conferences and many other small and medium, partly sub-regional organi-
sations, initiatives and programmes such as the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-
operation and the Union of Baltic Cities. At the ND Ministerial Meeting in Novem-
ber 2005, the Foreign Ministers, discussing the ND policies after 2006, praised the 
 
 
 
9   Lannon, Erwan and Peter Van Elsuwege: “The EU’s Northern Dimension and the EMP-
ENP: Institutional Frameworks and Decision-Making Processes Compared”. In: Peter G. 
Xuereb (ed.): The European Union and the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean’s Euro-
pean Challenge. Malta 2004, 3–70, 26.
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efforts carried out by AC, BEAC, CBSS and NCM.
10 These organisations have the 
official status of ND stakeholders or partners with a role in the implementation proc-
ess. The guidelines for the future ND policies identified the regional bodies as impor-
tant actors within the ND as they cover a wide range of co-operation issues in their 
respective areas. The guidelines stated that “the ND aims to enhance the synergies of 
these organisations, maximising the use of the resources available for the region, 
while avoiding any possible overlapping”
11. This last point is of particular impor-
tance as the risk for overlap and double structures is high, due to the large number of 
organisations and initiatives in North-Eastern Europe with a partly similar topical 
and geographical focus. The need for efficient co-ordination and closer co-operation 
between the ND actors can therefore not be underestimated. The new ND policy 
framework document outlines as tasks for the regional councils to “identify needs for 
development and co-operation in their respective areas and support project imple-
mentation in different ways”
12. 
To some extent, the ND can be regarded as being unique. It is a co-operation pro-
gramme in-between Community policies and initiatives within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policies (CFSP), but at the same time it also includes policies and objec-
tives from the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It is an EU based initiative but 
allows and even encourages contributions and involvement of other actors. It involves 
international parliamentary bodies, non-governmental and trans-national organisations, 
for example those bringing together cities or businesses or indigenous peoples in the 
region. It tries to engage the full range of civil society. Because of this involvement, 
the ND can be labelled as an example of potential multi-level or network governance 
 
 
 
10   Council of the European Union: Joint Press Release on the IV Northern Dimension Minis-
terial Meeting, held in Brussels on November 21, 2005, 14701/05 (Presse 305) 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/press_release_05.pdf, 
20 February 2008).
11   Council of the European Union: Guidelines for the development of a political declaration and 
a policy framework document for the Northern Dimension Policy from 2007, 14358/1/05 REV 
1, (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/guidelines05.pdf, Febraury 
20, 2008), 2. 
12   Finland’s EU Presidency:  Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document 
(http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/other_documents/vko47/en_GB/1164359527520/, 
February 20, 2008). 
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and an opportunity for multi-level policy infusion. To some extent, the ND cuts across 
the EU’s three-pillar structure and includes both external and internal policies: imple-
mentation and financing instruments are home-based in the first pillar (European 
Communities), the objectives and the problems to be addressed stem from the second 
(CFSP) and the third (JHA).
13
Recent meetings, developments and prospects 
The second NDAP expired by the end of 2006, and this could have been the end of 
the story. The ND had entered a trough in the early 2000s: The candidate states had 
their minds on accession; Russia seemed not bothered by it; and general interest 
among other than Nordic EU member states appeared to be rather low. The initiative 
really depended on the Nordic EU members keeping it going, and when Sweden failed 
to mention it in its 2001 presidency priorities, it seemed that it might fade away. So it 
was by no means self-evident that, at the start of 2007, the ND would enter a new 
stage with some important renewals, not least joint ownership, which would breathe 
new life into this policy. This became possible, since a modest renaissance in the for-
tunes of the ND, witnessed in 2005. Then, several high-level meetings were held, 
where politicians and academics praised the ND. 
In September 2005, the European Parliament discussed the ND and then passed a 
composite resolution which, inter alia, states: “The Northern Dimension entails both 
new potential and challenges […] preventing the emergence of new barriers […]”.
14 In 
order to streamline and upgrade the EU’s activities in the Baltic Sea region, the EP has 
called on the Commission to include a Baltic Sea Strategy, dealing with internal poli-
cies of the EU, in the forthcoming ND proposal.
15 On that basis, in 2006, the EP has 
 
 
 
13   Ojanen, Hanna: “The EU and Its ‘Northern Dimension’: an actor in search of a policy, or a 
policy in search of an actor?”. In: European Foreign Affairs Review 5 (2000:3), 359–376, 
374.
14   European Parliament: Joint Resolution on the future of the Northern Dimension, P6-TA-
PROV(2005)0430,  Strasbourg  2005 ( http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/seance_pleniere/ 
textes_adoptes/definitif/2005/11-16/0430/P6_TA(2005)0430_EN.doc, February 20, 2008).
15   Ibid. 
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drafted and adopted a proposal for such an EU Baltic Sea strategy and urged the Euro-
pean Commission to take this further. 
The British EU Presidency chaired a ND ministerial meeting held in the margins of the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels, on 21 November 2005. 
This was attended by the foreign ministers of the member states of the EU as well as 
Norway, Iceland and Russia, representatives of the major regional organisations in the 
ND area, international financial institutions and EU institutions. This can be compared 
with the inauspicious counterpart during the Finnish Presidency in 1999, attended by 
less than a handful of foreign ministers. Also the press release from the 2005 meeting 
made a number of positive points about the ND, including “the new Northern Dimen-
sion concept will provide a stable and permanent basis for this policy”
16. For the first 
time, the new ND will not be limited to a specified period of time. This might enable 
the ND to gain a more permanent character. Instead of issuing a third Action Plan, ND 
partners agreed to negotiate a Joint Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension 
Policy and a Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document. This was of a more 
political character than the previous action plans.
17 For the purpose of preparing these 
documents, the Council of the EU elaborated Guidelines for the Northern Dimension 
Policy from 2007, outlining the future structure and contents, which were adopted dur-
ing that meeting. The Finnish EU Presidency in the second half of 2006, held several 
ND high-level meetings preparing the new ND documents. The new ND documents 
were adopted in November 2006 during a ND summit – comprising high EU represen-
tatives, the President of the Russian Federation and the prime ministers of Norway and 
Iceland – at the margins of an EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki. 
The next stage: An analysis of trends in the ND 
There was clearly a political willingness to continue the ND policy beyond 2006. Tak-
ing previous problems and doubts into consideration, continuation was not self-
evident. An important development in enhancing the initiative may have been that in-
terest in the ND started to reach beyond the Nordic-Baltic area. Also relevant in up-
 
 
 
16   Council of the European Union 2005, as footnote 10. 
17   Tuomioja 2006, as footnote 8, 3. 
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grading the status of the ND, has been the strengthening of the group of Baltic Sea 
states within the EU after enlargement. It is a positive sign that the British EU Presi-
dency prepared the fourth ND Ministerial Meeting in November 2005 and contributed 
to the elaboration of the new guidelines, though the UK had to be prompted a little by 
the Finns and Swedes. The elaboration and adoption of the new policy framework 
document and the political declaration and therefore the future of the ND relied to a 
great extent on the 2006 Finnish Presidency. The ND had come “home”, so to speak. 
But the groundwork for a future ND was already laid through the adoption of the new 
guidelines. Since the November 2005 ND ministerial meeting, national governments, 
the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the regional or-
ganisations have done their “homework” by preparing the new framework documents 
and their specific contributions. 
Generally, the EU accession of the three Baltic States and Poland could potentially 
open up new opportunities to build a strong North-Eastern European and/or Baltic Sea 
bloc within the EU. In this context, the ND could become instrumental as a framework 
for promoting specific regional co-operation and assisting in better co-ordination of 
the various efforts in the North-Eastern part of the EU. As the Baltic Sea region still 
has to cope with various challenges and problems, any failure in this area would repre-
sent a lost chance. Finnish Foreign Trade Minister Paavo Väyrynen reminded partici-
pants in a ND seminar at the Technical University of Lappeenranta in May 2007, “that 
the Northern Dimension also has a role in the EU's internal policies”
18. He stressed in 
particular cross-border co-operation, with its potential to enhance economic and social 
development on both sides of the EU border, and the protection of the Baltic Sea envi-
ronment as internal EU issues in need of addressing by internal policies and pro-
grammes of the EU.
19
 
 
 
18  Address by Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, at the 
Northern Dimension Seminar The Renewed Northern Dimension Policy and the Next Steps 
– Focus on Energy Efficiency, Innovations and Logistics in Lappeenranta on May 31 – Ju-
ne 1, 2007, Speeches 5/31/2007 (www.norden2007.fi/public/default.aspx?conten-
tid=92256&nedeid=36240&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, February 20, 2008).
19   Ibid. 
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The proposal of the EP to launch an EU Baltic Sea strategy
20 as a vital part of the ND 
is both useful and sensible. Also, the working structures and co-operation partners of 
the CBSS emphasised the need to maintain the broad geographical scope of the ND 
including the Baltic Sea Region, the Arctic and the Barents areas and North-West Rus-
sia.
21 Obviously, these calls have been heard, as the Barents and the Baltic Seas are 
listed as new geographical priorities in the documents. Baltic Sea regional intergov-
ernmental co-operation as such is likely to be continued, in what forms and with what 
content, however, needs to be seen. CBSS foreign ministers, at their latest meeting in 
Malmö in June 2007, reached a consensus that the CBSS needs to be reformed in order 
to remain relevant and to be able to tackle future challenges.
22 They also welcomed the 
elaboration of an EU Baltic Sea strategy,
23 which could be utilised as a strong um-
brella for all the various co-operation efforts in the region. It is, however, an open 
question whether Russia would be willing to accept an EU strategy as the overall 
framework for Baltic Sea co-operation. 
More ND partnerships – for instance in education, transport, infrastructure and com-
munications, and with some impact on energy issues – could be a way to make the ND 
more concrete, practical, effective and transparent. The Northern Dimension Environ-
mental Partnership is broadly perceived as successful, and also within the Partnership 
on Social Health and Wellbeing, some important progress could be achieved. In the 
latter, the long organisational stage is due to be completed and the project work to be 
 
 
 
20   European Parliament: Parliamentary Conference on the Northern Dimension. Conference 
Statement. March 1, 2007 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/deea/documents/20070301_conference_s
tatement.pdf, February 20, 2008).
21   Council of the Baltic Sea States: Council of the Baltic Sea States’ survey on the Northern 
Dimension beyond 2006. Final Report by CBSS Secretariat Senior Adviser Philipp Schwartz. 
Stockholm 2006 
(http://www.cbss.st/documents/euand_baltic_region/eund/cbsssurveyonthendbeyond2006f
inalweb.pdf, February 20, 2008), 8.
22   Council of the Baltic Sea States: Declaration of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 
Malmö on  June 13, 2007 on a renewed Baltic Sea States Co-operation 
(http://www.cbss.org/baltinfo/dbaFile14511.doc, February 20, 2008).
23   Ibid. 
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started.
24 These partnerships are regarded as well-functioning examples of co-
operation between different actors when also the required financial means are made 
available. The Finnish Foreign Minister even labelled these partnerships as the great 
achievements of the ND.
25 Plans for establishing a ND partnership on transport and 
logistics seem to be active. The Nordic Investment Bank showed its interest in financ-
ing such partnership and issued a feasibility study which was introduced at a meeting 
in Brussels in June 2007. As long as such a partnership will not lead to duplications 
with current EU transport programmes and there are clear commitments on all sides,
26 
most stakeholders welcome these plans, since well-functioning transport and logistics 
chains are regarded as a prerequisite for the competitiveness and economic growth of 
the region.
27
In order to enhance coordination and to support the European Commission in exerting 
its lead role in the initiative, Finland proposed the establishment of a common body in 
the form of a joint steering group meeting regularly and including the EU, Russia, 
Norway and Iceland.
28 Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja saw a small operative body, 
in addition to the present biannual ministerial and senior officials’ meetings, as ensur-
ing efficient implementation and follow-up.
29 This certainly would be an important 
step to tackle the everlasting problem of failing co-ordination and overlap, and also it 
would have the potential to provide the ND with clearer leadership. 
The new policy framework document contains provisions in this respect. Until August 
2007, the newly established steering group had met twice. Whereas the first meeting 
dealt with organisational issues, the second one discussed concrete contents and pro-
 
 
 
24   Avetisyan, Andrey: “Russia and the Northern Dimension Policy.” Speech at a seminar on 
The renewed Northern Dimension Policy and the next steps – focus on Energy Efficiency, 
Innovations and Logistics at the Lappeenranta University of Technology, May 31 – June 1, 
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jects. While generally agreeing with the advantages of a steering group and regular 
meetings, the European Commission holds the position that the ND should remain a 
policy and not become an institution with its own budget.
30 The number of groups and 
meetings should be kept to a minimum.
31 Against the light of this attitude, the initial 
idea of establishing a ND secretariat for co-ordination purposes never was a serious 
nor feasible option. The Commission’s line, however, is debatable as several interna-
tional programmes have their own secretariat and even within the framework of the 
ND, the two existing partnerships run their own small secretarial unit integrated in an-
other organisation. A ND secretariat, preferably within the existing structures of one of 
the regional organisations, could have been a way to enhance the co-ordination of ac-
tivities and the visibility of the policy. 
While identifying the above signs in favour of the ND policy’s active continuation, 
less positive indications cannot be denied. According to some observers, interest in and 
commitment to the ND have hardly exceeded the Nordic-Baltic area. While in particu-
lar Finland and Sweden and, to a less extent, Denmark still support the initiative and 
develop new ideas, interests by EU members south of the ND region is much less de-
veloped.
32 From Germany, the largest and in political, as well as economic terms, most 
potent EU member state in the Baltic Sea region, little has been heard regarding the 
ND.
33 In the past, the ND was only high on the EU agenda when one of its Nordic 
member states was in charge of the EU Presidency.
34 As this is not likely to change, 
the ND may only return to the EU agenda after the EU Presidencies of Portugal, Slo-
venia and France , when Sweden takes on the presidency in 2009. The same applies to 
the elaboration of a possible EU Baltic Sea strategy. Others have expressed doubts a-
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bout the ND’s present situation and its future: the European Parliament considers the 
ND policy to still have a low profile and to suffer from a lack of co-ordination between 
the actors.
35 According to the former secretary-general of the Nordic Council of Minis-
ters, Per Unckel, the ND never was of high relevance for the NCM, but basically a 
Finnish-Russian affair with some EU support. 
Also, a certain competition amongst the various sub-regions in North-Eastern Europe 
covered by the ND can be identified. At the first parliamentary ND conference in 
Brussels in early 2007, representatives of the regional parliamentary assemblies 
strongly pushed the case of their respective sub-region (for instance Baltic Sea Parlia-
mentary Conference, Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Barents 
Parliamentary Conference). The Minister of State in the German Foreign Office, Gün-
ter Gloser, warned of the creation of competition between the regions and regions be-
ing played off against each other.
36 It will be one of the most sensitive tasks of the ND 
and its stakeholders to treat all these sub-regions equally, allowing them all to profit 
from the policy. 
To base the new ND on a political declaration and a framework policy document in-
stead of a new time-limited action plan, generates both positive and negative aspects. 
On the positive side, the ND may gain a more permanent and political character, which 
might be a way to upgrade the policy politically from its present low level. A disadvan-
tage could be that, while becoming more political, the new ND documents might be 
less technical and therefore less operational, one of the strong points of the second 
NDAP. In consequence, the risk of losing its operational character might make the new 
ND vaguer, creating in the worst case a sliding back into the first ND phase when gen-
eral interest was low and the objectives and means insufficiently concrete and opera-
tional. The new documents, covering in total only eight pages, may be seen as having a 
certain generality and not being too concrete about the priority sectors, the implemen-
tation of set objectives and, again, the role of the regional organisations within the ND 
framework. However, whether this will impede the implementation of the ND or 
whether the ND and its implementation mechanisms are so well-established that fur-
ther official written instructions are obsolete, remains to be seen. 
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As one of the most obvious problems has previously been overlap and lack of effective 
co-ordination, an important requirement for the new ND documents and the new ND 
in general was to define more clearly the role of the different actors involved. In par-
ticular, attention should be given to the role of the regional organisations and to devel-
oping mechanisms for efficient co-ordination and division of labour. This is the more 
important as the ND will have to rely on the active involvement of the regional organi-
sations, regarded by some as the most important ND actors.
37 Future success of the 
ND will depend, to some extent, on smooth interaction and co-operation between the 
institutions involved, resulting in a clear and transparent decision-making and imple-
mentation process. The common goals of the ND will only have a realistic chance of 
achievement if it becomes obvious who has what responsibilities and duties, if the de-
cision-making and policy-implementation processes are clearly outlined in the policy 
framework documents and if they can effectively be translated from theory to practice. 
On the efficient involvement of regional organisations, a clear indication of what such 
organisations can and should do, and what will be expected from them, would be help-
ful. However, as stated above, the new policy framework document was not more spe-
cific about the role of the regional organisations than its predecessors. But, possibly, the 
new ND steering group could be a more efficient way to enhance co-ordination among 
the participants. 
An important aspect of the ND in the future may be the closer involvement of parlia-
mentary actors. The political declaration called for the establishment of a Northern 
Dimension parliamentary forum.
38 In February/March 2007, representatives of various 
regional inter-parliamentary bodies and the European Parliament gathered in Brussels 
and agreed on a joint communiqué in which they expressed their support for the ND’s 
joint ownership and its overall aim to provide a common framework for the promotion 
of dialogue and concrete co-operation.
39 This parliamentary involvement and engage-
ment was welcomed by, for instance, the European Commission. In the words of the 
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Vice-President of the Commission, Margot Wallström, “mobilising the support from 
Parliaments across the region will be essential to ensure the new Northern Dimension 
Policy’s success”.
40 They may be particularly helpful in promoting the value of cross-
border co-operation.
41 Parliamentary organisations might be able, due to their direct 
links to the public, to raise the attention of the people to EU policies which to some 
extent affect their life and, again in Wallström’s words, “to promote better understand-
ing and contribute to a better life for its citizens”.
42 The parliamentary bodies have 
shown that they have the will, ability and expertise to contribute actively to the im-
plementation of the ND. This potential could and should be utilised more conse-
quently. 
The role of Russia 
In the medium term, relations with Russia in North-Eastern Europe will be the crucial 
aspect of the ND. Because of general economic interdependency, the consequences of 
the shift in economic relations between the Russian Federation and other states are 
important for the states and societies in the region, in particular in the field of energy. 
The new policy framework stresses functional co-operation, in particular in the areas 
of economics including trade, investments, energy, infrastructure, transport and logis-
tics, and the environment. Also freedom, security and justice, in particular the fight 
against organised crime, external security (civil protection), research, education and 
culture and social welfare and health were listed as important areas for future co-
operation in the policy framework document.
43 In geographical terms, a specific focus 
will remain on Kaliningrad and the Arctic as well as sub-arctic areas, but two addi-
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tional geographical priorities were introduced with the Barents and the Baltic Seas.
44 
All these are areas where the EU and EEA meet Russia. Cross-border co-operation 
enhancing regional development, involvement of civil society and people-to-people 
contacts will continue to be an important theme within the ND.
45 With regard to fi-
nancing, the principle of co-financing from ND partners and international and private 
financial institutions will be the general rule.
46
Another, and maybe the most important, encouraging indicator for the future of the 
ND is an increased willingness by the Russians, to be involved actively. Although a 
considerable part of the policy was dedicated to co-operation with North-West Russia 
in previous phases, for some time the Russian government did not show a strong inter-
est in the ND. One of the reasons for this low-key interest might have been that the 
country did not feel treated as an equal partner by the EU in the decision-making and 
implementation processes. In 2004, the Finnish Foreign Ministry pursued diplomatic 
efforts to upgrade Russia’s position and, backed by the Swedish government, achieved 
a breakthrough at the ND Ministerial Meeting in November 2005.
47 The press release 
of the meeting mentioned explicitly that Russia, as an equal partner, would participate 
in the drafting and adoption process of the new ND documents.
48 Co-operation within 
the ND would be tied to the general guidelines of EU-Russian co-operation.
49 This 
development enables Moscow to act increasingly as policy-maker, or policy co-maker, 
rather than in the obviously disliked role of policy-taker. All this would seem to sug-
gest that Pami Aalto was correct in assuming that the ND helps to overcome the divide 
between the EU and Russia in the north.
50
The adoption by the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia of the new ND strategy reveals 
its most important aspect: the joint ownership by the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. 
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However, in the future, the ND will become more instrumental as a regional expres-
sion of the four Common Spaces
51 forming the core of the future EU-Russia strategic 
partnership.
52 According to the new ND documents, the current ND issue areas will be 
re-focused in line with the four Common Spaces.
53 Nowadays the ND is not just de-
scribed as a regional expression of the four Common Spaces of EU-Russia relations, 
but is also used as a positive example of the EU’s “New Neighbourhood policy”, ad-
dressing the neighbouring countries of the enlarged EU. By this token, the future ND 
could also increasingly involve Ukraine and, possibly, Belarus. Thus the new ND 
could even more be understood as an approach of the EU to co-operate with the re-
gions at its external borders, thus creating new opportunities for the ND.
54 Neverthe-
less, a reservation should be entered here. This new placing of the ND within the wider 
EU-Russian relations could mean that the ND also increasingly becomes a hostage to 
this wider relationship rather than a possible exception to it. After all, the recent his-
tory of the links between the EU and Russia has not been too positive. 
The move to the four Common Spaces was an attempt to put some content back into 
sagging EU-Russian relations. It was a more positive response, by both sides, to diffi-
culties that arose within the relationship with the consequences of the Schengen visa 
regime for Kaliningrad after EU enlargement, and the feeling in Russia that including 
it in the European Neighbourhood Policy was treating the country as an object.
55 How-
ever, even the Common Spaces were criticised by some in Russia as being devoid of 
content,
56 and Russia has emerged, especially since President Putin’s re-election, as a 
more resolute and determined actor on the international scene. Averre pointed, in 2005, 
to the ambiguity in Russian policy towards the EU, with Putin talking about minimis-
ing the “risks and damage to the security of Russia’s economic interests” of EU and 
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NATO enlargement whilst building up “equal co-operation with the European Union 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”
57. Since then, Russian policy towards the 
EU seems to have stressed the former aspect rather than the co-operative element. This 
was perhaps best demonstrated in the failed EU-Russian summit held in Germany in 
2007.
58 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
59 tensions with 
the West “were partly a by-product of domestic Russian politics”
60, though the de-
ployment of US missile interceptors in central Europe was also seen as a breach of 
faith. Clearly with Putin’s centralisation of power and his reform of, and investment in, 
military power
61 the EU faces a different Russia than that under Yeltsin, when the 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement was signed between the two sides. A confi-
dent Putin has wielded the “energy weapon” in his hands – Russia’s supply of Euro-
pean markets with natural gas – and has noticed that Russia can do business with key 
states such as Germany while ignoring the feelings of the Baltic states.
62 The danger 
there is that a revived ND tied too closely to the Common Spaces and the wider EU-
Russian relations could rise and fall with the general temperature of that relationship. 
The very success, albeit limited, of the ND has been in its ability to deal with localised 
issues regardless of the general climate. 
In sum, a key point about the next stage of the ND is that the content of the new politi-
cal declaration and policy framework document was determined through negotiations 
between all the parties involved. This underlines in particular the important objective 
of transforming the ND into a common policy of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. 
As such, co-ownership and equality of partners can be seen as one of the requirements 
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for achieving the earlier mentioned network governance
63 – the new ND may have the 
potential to achieve such a goal better than ever before. However, if it is tied too close-
ly to the future of the Common Spaces, it may suffer in case they should fail. Further-
more, should the future ND be reduced to a regional tool of the strategic partnership 
between the EU and Russia, it would overemphasise its external dimension while pos-
sibly neglecting the internal one. The new guidelines for the ND only briefly men-
tioned issues other than those connected to the four Common Spaces at a regional level 
and lacks greater concreteness when referring to the entire North.
64
Conclusions 
Hanna Ojanen wrote that the Northern Dimension, in its earlier form, injected new fuel 
into the EU’s external relations, providing “a broad view on security and conflict pre-
vention, and ‘socialisation’ as a complement to the process of enlargement”
65. That 
process has now been undertaken. The modest activities of the ND helped to underpin 
the grander scheme of enlargement with a microcosm of functional activities. Indeed, 
rather than being powered by high-octane fuel, the ND seemed to rest on a diet of ba-
sic but worthy Northern gruel. Ojanen also pointed to the problematic aspects of the 
ND: “notably involving the ‘objects’ in the making of EU policies that concern them, 
internal co-ordination, including between the pillars, and inter-organisational co-
operation”
66. This brief overview of the most recent developments in the ND has 
shown that Russia, as well as Norway and Iceland, have been involved more as “sub-
jects” rather than as mere “objects” of the ND. It shows that there is an increasing 
awareness of the problems of co-ordination, though there is still much to be achieved 
in practical terms. 
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From the perspective of Bordering Europe, the ND also offers some interesting in-
sights. On the whole, the EU has tried to treat such an important state as Russia as an 
equal, but the make-up of the EU – with the necessity of the Commission leading on 
trade policy and the need to negotiate among the member states on CFSP matters – 
had, in fact, left little leeway for Russia in negotiations with the EU until President 
Putin was able to wield the “energy weapon” after the rise in oil prices from 2004. De-
spite what may have been the intention of many in the EU, relations between the EU 
and Russia have resembled “them and us”. With EU enlargement in 2004, a new 
boundary seemed to have been drawn, not least in Northern Europe. The Baltic states, 
the Nordic states and Poland were on the inside. Russia, Belarus and possibly Ukraine 
were on the outside. Little that has happened since then, in general EU-Russian rela-
tions, has changed this. Even the Russo-German gas pipeline has given the impression 
of a Russia trying to “divide and rule” the EU in a neo-realist fashion rather than an 
agreement based on mutual interests. 
However, the ND has provided an alternative liberal institutionalist model to this ra-
ther harsh bordering. It has seen Russia treated as a participant that has engaged in a 
number of partnerships with the EU and EU states. There has been an emphasis on 
civil society and on common problems. Not least, there has been an attempt to engage 
Kaliningrad in the process. In other words, there has been an effort to blur the borders 
and to make sharp lines, such those for instance, intended by the Schengen Agreement, 
fuzzy. 
The ND faces a choice between being effective in a few areas or trying to be compre-
hensive in both its functional and geographic cover. In particular, the pragmatism and 
hard work of the Nordic EU members suggest that an answer will be found to this di-
lemma. The new stage of the ND provides further opportunities for change in what has 
proved to be an innovative tool for EU policy. The danger for the ND lies in the con-
nection between itself and the larger strategic EU-Russian relationship. If the ND is 
seen by both sides as being guarded against negative feedback from the wider relation-
ship, then it could mean that Northern Europe would remain as a pocket of post-
bordered Europe. If, however, the wider relations start to affect the ND, then a return 
to division in the north along fairly traditional lines can be expected. 
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